

four lines of defence for safe data

experiences in auditing information
security




Dr. R. Willemse, Court of Audit of Rotterdam
International Seminar Eurorai
19th of April, 2018

why auditing information security?

- local authorities more and more work with highly sensitive information
- growing attention for privacy; new regulations (GDPR)
- In Rotterdam big data leak, also of councillors!
- formal request of council for audit


three audit perspectives

- has executive board formulated an adequate policy?
- is this policy implemented well?
- does it work?



formulation and implementation

- well formulated policy
 - risk analyses
 - privacy impact assessments
 - pdca-cycle
- not adequately implemented



does information security policy really work?

four different tests:

- external penetration
- internal penetration
- walking in
- social engineering

performed by specialized bureau (ethical hackers)



FIRST line of defence: secure your systems from outside intruders

how to test:

- externally from the internet, outside municipal offices
- without notification!

few vulnerabilities:

- non secured websites
- outdated web mail installations





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SECOND line of defence: secure your systems from inside intruders

how to test:

- inside the municipal offices, with own devices
- trying to hack with or without given account/password
- again: without notification

severe vulnerabilities

- able to detect administrator's password
- no segmentation
- able to get in everywhere, to do everything



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THIRD line of defence: do not let outside intruders get in physically


how to test:

- try getting unauthorized access to municipal buildings

easy to get in:

- in every tested building
- access to sensitive paper documents and (server) rooms
- never stopped, sometimes even accompanied






FOURTH line of defence: strengthen awareness of employees

how to test


- drop contaminated usb-sticks (in combination with walk in tests)
- spear phishing
- voice phishing

awareness not strong

- several sticks opened
- infected links opened



To



Show details



Beste meneer of mevrouw,

De stichting Revaliderende Vrienden zou graag een keer een rondleiding op het stadhuis genieten. De groepen en enkele voorgestelde dagen/weeken zijn bijgesloten in de spreadsheet.

Omdat deze persoonsgegevens bevat is deze beveiligd met het wachtwoord:

#Samsung2k16

Kunt u laten weten of de voorgestelde bezoeken binnen uw agenda passen?
Alvast bedankt.

Met vriendelijke groet,

John Muller

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+31 6 8209 4245


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
overall conclusion

- despite rather well protection against external intrusions, still combination of:
 - failing security against attacks from inside
 - failing physical security
 - too little security awareness employees



implications

- **failing security not just technical issue or administrative problem**
- **implies severe risks on:**
 - identity fraud
 - physical unsafety public officials
 - disturbance of public order
 - sabotage of public services
 - misuse of public resources



finally

- **discussion on publication results**
- **principle of responsible disclosure**
- **follow up audit after year:**
 - hackers did not succeed in getting in
 - physical security improved
 - much stronger awareness employees
- **initial audit very effective**

